Prima facie, competitiveness adjustments in the eurozone, based on unit labor cost developments, appear sensible and in line with what the economic analyst might have predicted and the economic doctor might have ordered. But a broader and arguably better-Balassa-Samuelson-Penn (BSP)-framework for analyzing these adjustments paints a very diff erent picture. Taking advantage of the newly released PPP-based estimates of the International Comparison Program (2011), we identify a causal BSP relationship. We apply this framework to computing more appropriate measures of real competitiveness changes in Europe and other advanced economies in the aftermath of the recent global crises. Th ere has been a deterioration, not improvement, in competitiveness in the periphery countries between 2007 and 2013. Second, the pattern of adjustment within the eurozone has been dramatically perverse, with Germany having improved competitiveness by 9 percent and with Greece's having deteriorated by 9 percent. Th ird, real competitiveness changes are strongly correlated with nominal exchange rate changes, which suggests the importance of having a fl exible (and preferably independent) currency for eff ecting external adjustments. Fourth, internal devaluation-defi ned as real competitiveness improvements in excess of nominal exchange rate changes-is possible but seems limited in scope and magnitude. Our results are robust to adjusting the BSP framework to take account of the special circumstances of countries experiencing unemployment. Even if we ignore the BSP eff ect, the broad pattern of limited and lopsided adjustment in the eurozone remains.
INTRODUCTION
Germany has had a pretty good eurozone crisis. Relative to the precrisis peak, its per capita GDP (in purchasing power parity [PPP] terms) has increased by about 11 percent. In contrast, the rest of the eurozone experienced a decline of 0.5 percent, and the four southern Europeans-Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain-a decline of 6 percent (fi gure 1). Th us, relative to the Germanic core, the southern peripherals, which saw some catch-up since 2000, have experienced a dramatic decline in living standards of about 13 percent within the space of six years (fi gure 2). Living standards have slipped even in the United States-and considerably by about 10 percent-relative to Germany since the onset of the global fi nancial crisis.
Germany knows all too well the current plight of the periphery. In the 1920s it was Germany that, facing added budgetary stress from the postwar reparations, struggled to regain competitiveness against its European peers and engineer improvements in its current account within a fi xed exchange regime imposed by the victors at Versailles. Generations later, the Greeks found themselves in a similar situation but this time in the context of constraints imposed by the currency union in Europe. 1 At fi rst blush, the Versailles redux charge appears unfair. Currency adjustments in the eurozone appear to have occurred as might be expected or desired. Consider an often used measure of competitiveness changes based on unit labor cost (ULC) developments. Th e data are from the European Commission's annual macroeconomic database (AMECO). 2 We plot in fi gure 3 the changes in this measure of competitiveness between 2007 and 2013 (from the start of the crisis to the most recent period for which data are available) against the initial level of the current account balance.
Th e relationship should be strongly positive because countries with high initial defi cits should see the largest improvement in their competitiveness. If we leave aside the case of Bulgaria, which is an outlier, we do see in the second panel such a positive relationship. High current account defi cit countries such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland witnessed a real depreciation (based on unit labor costs) of 14, 10, and 15 percent, respectively, facilitating the process of adjustment. In contrast surplus countries such as Luxembourg witnessed a sharp appreciation. And six European countries-Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain-did achieve internal devaluation defi ned as declines in relative unit labor costs in excess of the nominal depreciation.
1. A more tendentious parallel with Versailles is to see Germany today as the victor and self-serving underwriter of the underlying economic and currency arrangements much as the victors at Versailles who imposed the harsh peace on Germany.
2. Th ere are a number of unit labor cost measures to choose from. Specifi cally we chose the "Real eff ective exchange rates, based on unit labor costs (total economy): performance relative to the rest of the 37 industrial countries: double export weights; USD: performance relative to the rest of the 36 industrial countries" measure from the European Commission's AMECO database. Data on real eff ective exchange rates, "Relative unit labor costs 2010 = 100" from the OECD yields broadly similar results in subsequent applications, but we choose the former data source due to wider country availability.
But several reasons caution against any sanguineness or complacency about the adjustment process in the eurozone. First, look closer at fi gure 3; the relationship does not look as strong as it should be (a correlation of 0.56). Worrying, in particular, is the fact that Germany, the core country, the anchor of the eurozone, and the one with the largest surplus to begin with, witnessed very little real appreciation.
Second, note that there is one major problem with ULC-based measures relative to the PPP pricebased measures. Th ese ULC estimates are derived only for a sample of industrial countries. By defi nition, therefore, they will fail to take account of competitiveness developments in partner countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Th us, China, India, Brazil, and a number of other emerging-market countries that are in actual or potential competition with OECD countries, and that today are major players in the world economy, are ignored.
Th ird, at the heart of the debate between the Keynesians and the austerians is downward wage rigidity and the welfare costs of adjustment through internal devaluation versus adjustment via exchange rates (Krugman 2012 , Wolf 2014 . Th erefore, from a welfare perspective, it is arguable whether unit labor costs are the better measure of adjustment compared with exchange rate-based measures. At least, it is important to check how competitiveness changes have fared when they are based on exchange rates.
Finally, raw unit labor cost measures obscure a potentially important development associated with the eurozone crisis. Th ere have been sharp output changes as well and the issue arises whether these must be taken into account in assessing the magnitude of adjustment. Greece has lost about 25 percent of its per capita output since 2007. Should that not necessitate an even greater adjustment/competitiveness response compared with Germany, which has seen its output rise during the crisis?
Th ere is an alternate framework for assessing competitiveness changes that takes account of all these concerns with the simple unit labor cost measures. Th is paper will therefore deploy this BalassaSamuelson-Penn (BSP) framework to evaluate how the eurozone has fared in the recent crisis. In particular, this paper has three aims. First is to identify a causal BSP relationship, which relates income growth to real exchange rate changes. 3 Th is has become possible because of newly available estimates of 3. We will refer to the Balassa-Samuelson-Penn (BSP) eff ect to give credit to the work of the Penn World Tables that put fl esh and numbers to the original Balassa-Samuelson theoretical intuition.
Our results based on the BSP framework are the following. First, there has been a deterioration, not improvement, in competitiveness in the periphery countries. Second, the pattern of adjustment within the eurozone between 2007 and 2013 has been dramatically perverse, with Germany's competitiveness having improved by 9 percent and Greece's having deteriorated by 9 percent. Optimum adjustment within the eurozone required the exact opposite. Th ird, real competitiveness changes are strongly correlated with nominal exchange rate changes, which suggests the importance of a fl exibly independent currency to eff ect adjustments. Internal devaluation-real competitiveness changes in excess of nominal exchange rate changes-is possible but occurred in few cases and seemed limited in magnitude.
One critique of the BSP framework is that it is not applicable to countries experiencing Keynesian underemployment of resources. While theoretically this argument is valid, our results suggest that the experience of advanced economies suff ering unemployment is not inconsistent with the BSP eff ect. In any case, our results are robust to adjusting the BSP framework to take account of the special circumstances of countries experiencing unemployment. Even if we completely ignore the BSP eff ect, the broad pattern of limited and lopsided adjustment in the eurozone remains.
Overall, our results suggest that the costs of fi xing a currency-via either a currency union or a hard peg-can be considerable, echoing the famously prescient Walters critique (1990) of the eurozone.
ESTIMATING THE DYNAMIC BALASSA-SAMUELSON-PENN EFFECT
With a view to better compare standards of living across countries, the ICP has been collecting disaggregated data across countries since 1970. Th ere have been eight such rounds, with the most recent relating to the price collection exercise in 2011, resulting in the publication in April 2014 of PPP-based estimates of GDP across countries.
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Based on work fi rst done by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978) and drawing upon the ICP data, the Penn World Tables (PWT) project has been publishing internationally comparable estimates of GDP. Th e innovation and great contribution of the PWT was to convert national measures of GDP and income into internationally comparable PPP estimates. Th is is done-in principle-by collecting prices for the same or similar goods in diff erent countries and deriving price indices that can be used to compare what people can actually buy. Th e PWT obtains local currency data from the national income accounts of countries. Th en, based on international price comparisons, it converts these local currency data into PPP-based fi gures, which are comparable across countries.
But PPP-based estimates have value beyond comparisons of standards of living. Intrinsic to these estimates is the notion of the real exchange rate. Rogoff (1996) highlighted that, when defl ated by the market exchange rate, the PPP exchange rate for a country that emerges from the ICP exercise is really a 4. See Deaton (2014) and Johnson et al. (2013) for a brief history of the ICP project and the Penn World Tables.
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measure of the price level in any country relative to the numeraire country, the United States, and hence a measure of that country's real exchange rate.
Th us for any country:
where P is the price level of GDP, PPP is the purchasing power parity exchange rate relative to the dollar, and MER is the market exchange rate relative to the dollar. Th is price level is conceptually the (inverse) of the real exchange rate: Th e higher the prices in any country, the more appreciated its currency is in real terms. Rogoff (1996) then discussed the BSP eff ect, namely that countries with higher per capita GDP tended to have higher price levels (or more appreciated real exchange rates). Th e BSP eff ect was in eff ect a reason why purchasing power parity did not hold, which was the central focus of Rogoff (1996) .
Th e BSP eff ect in turn could arise for two reasons. Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argued that compared with poor countries, rich countries tended to be relatively more productive in their traded good sector. Via labor market equilibrium, higher productivity would entail higher wages in the economy and hence higher prices for nontraded goods. Th e price level, which is a weighted average of traded and nontraded goods prices, should therefore be higher in richer countries.
A second reason for the BSP eff ect is due to Kravis and Lipsey (1983) and Bhagwati (1984) . Th ey suggested that capital-labor ratios are likely to be higher in rich countries (because of imperfect capital mobility). Combined with the fact that services are more labor-intensive, high capital-labor ratio would mean that services would be cheaper in poorer countries and hence the overall price level lower. Th is BSP eff ect is a static one, comparing countries at a point in time.
Th us, following Rogoff (1996) , the static BSP eff ect can be represented as:
where P is the price level of GDP and Y is the per capita GDP of a country relative to the United States. Figure 4 shows the static BSP eff ect for 2011. Th e relationship is a strong one with the income coeffi cient signifi cant at the 1 percent confi dence level. A country that is 1 percent richer has a price level that is, on average, 0.2 percent higher.
5 Ravallion (2013 Ravallion ( , 2014 , among others, has argued in favor of a dynamic version of the BSP eff ect, analogous to the static version. 6 If productivity growth in manufacturing rises, but if prices of 5. Th e static Penn eff ect is actually better captured by a quadratic specifi cation consistent with Hassan (2014) .
6. Th e focus of Ravallion (2013 Ravallion ( , 2014 ) is less to identify the causal BSP relationship and more to see whether it can help improve forecasts of the PPPs beyond the ICP benchmark years. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2009) estimate a pooled cross-section manufactured (traded) goods are fixed internationally, wages will have to rise to create the real wage gains to match productivity improvements. But if services productivity has not risen, then to retain labor in the services sector, prices of services will have to rise. Thus, overall prices will increase-and the real exchange rate will appreciate-when traded goods productivity increases.
Ravallion (2013) estimates a dynamic version of equation 2 above:
where V represents the valuation of a country's currency, with positive (negative) values indicating overvaluation (undervaluation); and � � and � � are the coefficients of the BSP equation (2) estimated using OLS.
It is just a logical step to extend this approach to currency valuation to a dynamic context. Thus:
where ∆ lnP is the log change in price level between two time periods and ∆ lnY and is the growth rate in per capita GDP. Second, the dynamic BSP effect is not a correlation but a causal relationship going from rising traded goods productivity to appreciating real exchange rates. If the effect is to be reliably estimated ("identified" in the jargon), equation 3 will have to take account of the reverse causation from the real exchange rate changes back to GDP growth. And this channel of reverse causation is potentially significant. A number of recent papers, notably Rodrik (2009) and Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2008) , estimate strong effects from an undervalued exchange rate to growth. A stronger real exchange rate could actually stifle growth by inhibiting the allocation of resources to the more productive tradable sector.
Identifying the true BSP effect, therefore, requires a plausible instrument. Since, we are estimating the equation over the 2005-11 period (the two points for which price level data are available from the ICP), we need an instrument that captures or explains short-run growth (the right hand side variable).
equation that is more like a static than a dynamic version of the BSP effect. Recently, Berka, Devereux, and Engel (2014) estimate real exchange rates and sectoral productivity in the eurozone but with a different focus.
7. In equations (2) and (3), the income/growth variable can be measured at PPP or market exchange rates. The former will create mechanical statistical complications because the PPPs will appear on both sides of the equation. Hence we prefer to use the latter.
8. In our study, we use 142 countries that were covered in both the 2005 and 2011 ICP rounds, minus Zimbabwe, which experienced hyperinflation during this period.
Th is stipulation rules out instruments such as institutional quality because they better explain long-run growth and levels of income (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). 9 But the instrument must also plausibly satisfy the exclusion restriction. Th at is, it must explain changes in the real exchange rate (the left hand side variable) only through its eff ects on growth in per capita GDP (the right hand side variable). Th e instrument must not directly aff ect the real exchange rate.
Put diff erently, the instrument must, to the maximum extent possible, be neutral between tradables and nontradables because otherwise it is more likely to aff ect the relative price of these two sectors, which is the real exchange rate. Th is consideration would rule out instruments such as trade, trade costs, or geography variables that disproportionately aff ect the costs and/or profi tability in traded goods production.
Intuitively, plausible instruments are inputs into production that are themselves not tradable and that are not clearly more intensively used in tradables relative to nontradables. One input that might possibly satisfy these requirements even if imperfectly-and the one we chose in this paper-is electricity. Specifi cally, we use per capita electricity consumption growth as our instrument. We work with two variants. Th e fi rst is overall electricity consumption growth measured over the same period as per capita GDP growth. We think of electricity use in production as being similar between tradables and nontradables. Th e second variant is residential electricity, which is a consumption-based measure and hence less biased toward either tradables or nontradables production. Both variants are tested to check the robustness of our results, but we ultimately instrument with the more general measure of total electricity consumption in fi nal specifi cations due to wider data availability.
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Data and Samples
We use a number of data sources. 10. Electricity consumption is by no means a perfect instrument for income growth. For example, there is reverse endogeneity within the instrument itself: Does electricity consumption lead to growth, or does growth lead to more electricity consumption? Th is is of particular relevance when considering residential electricity consumption which intuitively would work only in the latter direction, and another reason we do not use this measure in our fi nal specifi cations. Our preferred measure is more akin to electricity production which is less prone to this reverse endogeneity problem because it is an input to growth, and not caused by growth, at least in principle. Despite these salient points, the high T-values in fi rst stage estimations illustrate that both instruments used as a statistical tool to separate the causal mechanisms between income growth and the real exchange rate, appear to be an eff ective fi rst take at identifying a causal BSP framework. We next estimate the dynamic BSP equation using our instrumental variables (IV). In table 2 we present results of the fi rst and second stage results when total per capita electricity consumption is used as our instrument. Th e fi rst stage results for our chosen sample (core, excluding SSA countries) are shown in fi gure 6. Th e instrument is signifi cant with a t-statistic of 7.6 in the core sample and 8.5 in the sample without SSA countries, which far exceeds the threshold of 3 suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) for strong instruments. Th e R-square in the fi rst stage is also high. We thus appear to have very strong instruments.
Th e second stage results shown in fi gure 6 and table 2 are also plausible. Compared with the OLS results, the coeffi cients are greater and the R-squares are higher. Th e fact that the IV estimates are greater than the corresponding OLS estimates is consistent with negative reverse causation from exchange rate changes to growth. Negative reverse causation tends to pull down the OLS estimate. Once this is accounted for the pure BSP eff ect is greater. Our OLS and especially our IV estimates appear to be substantially greater than those in Ravallion (2013) and Inklaar (2014) . Our magnitudes range from 0.4 to 0.7 for OLS results and 0.6 to 0.8 for instrumented coeffi cients compared with about 0.3 in these other papers. Accounting for reverse causation explains part of the diff erence while diff erent samples could account for the rest.
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To check the robustness of our results, we try a few data variations, which are documented in appendix table A.2. In combinations A and C, we substitute real GDP per capita growth in constant US dollars with PPP income growth, which in general makes the coeffi cients even higher. In combinations B and C, we instrument income growth with per capita residential electricity consumption. In every case but the advanced country-only sample, coeffi cients are signifi cant at least at the 5 percent level and not substantially diff erent in magnitude, generally staying in the 0.5 -0.8 range. For our small sample of 15. Ravallion (2013 15. Ravallion ( , 2014 and Inklaar (2014) do not instrument for per capita GDP growth and do not drop oil exporters and small economies from their sample. We also drop observations from Tajikistan and Moldova in all instrumented models, as these countries were found to be signifi cant outliers. If we reestimate the dynamic BSP eff ect using a completely unrestricted sample, the OLS coeffi cient is 0.32 and the IV coeffi cient is 0.27, although only the OLS result is signifi cant at acceptable levels. Th ese coeffi cients are more in line with previous fi ndings.
advanced countries, coefficients are mostly significant without Korea, which is an outlier, but insignificant if we include Korea. 
Applying And VAlidAting the dynAmic BSp equAtion
Frankel (2006) was amongst the first to propose that the BSP equation could be used to assess exchange rates, namely to check for undervaluation and overvaluation. Since then, this method has been used by several authors including Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2009) Thus for each country:
where V represents the valuation of a country's currency, with positive (negative) values indicating overvaluation (undervaluation); and
α � 1 and β � 1 are the coefficients of the BSP equation (2) estimated using OLS.
It is just a logical step to extend this approach to currency valuation to a dynamic context.
Thus:
where the coefficients are from the BSP equation (3) estimated using our instrumental variables. A positive (negative) value of DV represents a decline (improvement) in competitiveness. DV thus measures how much a currency's competitiveness has changed taking account of the fact that some change in the real exchange rate is "natural" and related to economic growth (i.e., some real exchange rate change is an equilibrium phenomenon stemming from the BSP effect). Thus DV is arguably a measure of the "true" change in competitiveness. Based on the above we can measure and compare three measures of competitiveness changes across countries summarized in table 3, along with the shorthand reference terms we use for each throughout the rest of the paper.
One important point is inadequately appreciated. Like the IMF's Consultative Group on Exchange
Rate Issues (CGER) model described in Lee et al. (2008) and unlike the approach in Cline and Williamson (2008) or the unit labor cost measures produced by the OECD, PPP-based approaches to assessing exchange rates such as in the ICP methodology have the virtue of being general equilibrium in spirit, where the price level of GDP for all countries is determined simultaneously based on the detailed and disaggregated price data (see technical appendix 1 in Johnson et al. 2013) . Thus, exchange rates are determined simultaneously, ensuring some degree of consistency across estimates for countries (for example, not all countries can simultaneously have undervalued or overvalued exchange rates). Th is is one advantage of PPP-based real exchange rate measures over the traditional macroeconomic ones computed by the IMF (the nominal and real eff ective exchange rate series) and a number of investment banks.
Before we present the main results, we want to validate our framework, notably the usefulness of accounting for the BSP eff ect, which is illustrated in fi gure 7. We plot the simple change in the real exchange rate (measure 1 in table 3) on the y-axis and the change in competitiveness based on accounting for the BSP eff ect (measure 3 in table 3 on the x-axis for select eurozone, euro-tied, and industrializedcountry comparators. Th e 45 degree line is also shown in this fi gure. Every point in the fi gure is above the 45 degree line, suggesting that the simple real exchange rate can be a systematically misleading measure of the change in real competitiveness.
For some countries, both measures show deteriorating competitiveness (Japan, Switzerland, Greece, Latvia, Canada, etc.), but the simple measure overstates the deterioration and in some cases substantially (Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic). But once account is taken of Germany's growth rate and the resulting equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation, the real improvement in competitiveness was close to 13.4 percent. Table 4 presents the results for all three measures of changes in competitiveness for three groups of countries-eurozone countries, countries with their own currencies but that closely track the euro, and countries with their own currencies that are relatively fl exible.
As a robustness exercise, we show in table 5, similar results for a group of emerging-market currencies. Th is table suggests that all the estimates are plausible. We also fi nd that the estimates based on the OLS version of the BSP equation are quite close to those based on the IV version of the equation (see the correlations in table 6 ). In other words, although the IV version produces a marginally larger dynamic BSP coeffi cient than its OLS counterpart, the residuals do not change substantially.
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Finally, we report in table 6 a series of correlation coeffi cients to explore the extent to which our various measures of exchange rate and competitiveness changes move together. We can see that during
2005-11 the change in the real exchange rate is highly correlated with both the OLS and IV-derived changes in competitiveness, as well as the residual averaged over our various robustness-check regressions.
17. Specifi cally, we are comparing the residuals derived from table 1, specifi cation 1.3 (OLS) and table 2, specifi cation 2.3 (IV).
Two correlations are worth highlighting. Th e PPP-based measure of the real exchange rate and the IMF's real eff ective exchange rate are highly but not perfectly correlated (0.82). Our preferred measure of real competitiveness (adjusted for the BSP eff ect) is even less tightly correlated with the IMF's real eff ective exchange rate (0.72). Th us, PPP-based measures that we estimate here contain diff erent information from the conventional (IMF) measure of real exchange rates.
COMPETITIVENESS CHANGES IN THE EUROZONE AND BEYOND AND LESSONS FOR EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
In principle, this framework can be applied to assessing the exchange rate of any country; the Chinese currency has been the principal target for this framework (Frankel 2006 , Cheung et al. 2009 . We chose instead to focus on the eurozone (and other industrial economies) because of the seriousness of the crisis and the raging policy debates around exchange rate regimes and the role they have played in the aftermath of the crisis. 18 A number of papers have discussed adjustment in the eurozone (Tressel et al. 2014 , IMF 2012 , Shambaugh 2012 ) but none have adopted our approach. A few key points stand out.
Limited and Lopsided Adjustments
First, properly measured (i.e., accounting for the BSP eff ect), there has been little improvement in competitiveness in the euro periphery (table 7) . Between 2007 and 2013, the adjustment has been in the wrong direction in Greece, Spain, and Italy with appreciations of 9, 1.5, and 1.5, respectively. In Portugal, the improvement has been relatively minor.
18. Since our focus is on Europe, all our estimates are based on the sample that excludes SSA countries. Second, and related, fi gure 8 illustrates how lopsidedly inadequate (even perverse) the pattern of adjustment within the eurozone has been. Th e fi gure plots the current account balance (on the x-axis at the beginning of the crisis period in 2007) against the real competitiveness change that has occurred since (on the y-axis). Ideally, the line should have been strongly and signifi cantly upward sloping because adjustment requires competitiveness improvements (moving down on the y-axis) in defi cit countries and appreciations (moving up on the y-axis) in surplus countries. But the line of best fi t is essentially fl at for both the eurozone and euro-tied country samples, with statistically insignifi cant correlation coeffi cients of -0.03 and 0.04, respectively. Th ese results contrast sharply with results that assess competitiveness based on unit labor costs (see fi gure 3).
Th e periphery countries with defi cits (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy) have witnessed deteriorating competitiveness while Germany has witnessed the biggest improvement in competitiveness of about 9 percent (other core countries such as Austria and Belgium with surpluses also witness essentially no diff erences in competitiveness). Th e diff erential between Germany, which needed to reduce its current account surplus, and Greece, which needed to improve its current account defi cit, has been a whopping 18 percent but in exactly the wrong direction.
Importance of Nominal Flexibility
As fi gure 9 illustrates there is a strong relationship between changes in real competitiveness and nominal 21. Nominal exchange rate changes can be measured in three ways: bilateral against the dollar; fully multilateral using the IMF's nominal eff ective exchange rate series; or quasi-multilateral against the SDR. Each has its strengths and shortcomings. Th e bilateral rate has the virtue that it captures as identical the common shock faced by all eurozone countries. Th e advantage of the nominal eff ective series is that it captures the trade and pricing consequences of the common shock. We chose, as a compromise, the rate against the SDR because it is identical across all eurozone countries and by including more than one country can refl ect, if not fully capture, the trade and pricing consequences of the exchange rate shock. In any case, our results are very similar even if we use the IMF's nominal eff ective exchange rate instead of the SDR rate (appendix fi gure A.1, for example, is the counterpart of fi gure 9; the correlation coeffi cient between the two nominal rates is close to 0.98).
Limited Scope for Internal Devaluation
One qualifi cation to the strong positive relationship between nominal changes and real changes relates to the eurozone itself. Figure 10 is identical to fi gure 9, except that we draw a 45 degree line instead of the line of best fi t. It illustrates that a given nominal depreciation of 2 percent (of the euro against the SDR)
has sustained a large variation in real competitiveness changes, ranging from a deterioration of 9 percent for Greece (14 percent for Luxembourg and 5 percent for Cyprus) to an improvement of 1 percent for Latvia, 5 percent for Ireland, and 9 percent for Germany. In other words, a common 2 percent nominal depreciation has sustained a variation of almost 23 percent in real competitiveness changes.
What should one make of this dramatically large variation in country-specifi c responses to a common nominal exchange rate shock? Two issues are important here. Th e fi rst relates to internal devaluation and the scope for it in a currency zone. Figures 10 and 11 shed light on this issue. In fi gure 11, we show the zone of internal devaluation, which we defi ne as comprising cases where there has been a real exchange rate depreciation (measure 1) and one exceeding an equivalent nominal depreciation.
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We see that internal devaluation was achieved in only Ireland, one out of 33 countries in our sample. In Ireland, the same nominal depreciation resulted in a real depreciation of 4 percent. Th e scope for internal devaluation thus seems limited.
In fi gure 10, we show the zone of internal devaluation, which we defi ne as comprising cases where there has been a real competitiveness improvement (measure 3, which accounts for the BSP eff ect) and one exceeding an equivalent nominal depreciation. If we assess internal devaluation based on achieving such real competitiveness improvements, then seven out of 33 countries achieved internal devaluation.
Th ey are Albania, Bosnia, Germany, Ireland, Macedonia, Poland, and Portugal. And for these countries, the real competitiveness changes in excess of the nominal exchange rate change was 4.5 percent on average. Overall, the scope for internal devaluation does not seem limitless.
The Curse of Local Exorbitant Privileges
Th e perverse nature of adjustment between the reserve currency country Germany (and even France) relative to the periphery highlights a possible structural or intrinsic fl aw in the make-up of a currency union.
Germany enjoys two related "local exorbitant privileges:" lower interest rates as capital fl ees from the periphery to the core but without suff ering the consequent appreciation because of being yoked to 22. We do not focus on cases where real competitiveness deteriorations are more muted than nominal appreciations because such cases involve wage increases. Internal devaluation, on the other hand, requires downward wage fl exibility, which is what we want to assess.
the weak periphery (see Subramanian 2013) . 23 Th ese local exorbitant privileges allow it to have more expansionary aggregate demand, which during depressed times leads to higher output and employment.
In contrast, the periphery endures austerity, which is limited in its ability to deliver the required "internal devaluation."
LIMITATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
While our results are striking, they encounter one important objection. Th e BSP eff ect is a mediumterm structural phenomenon, stemming from diff erential productivity growth in tradables and is only validly estimated and applied under conditions of full or close to full employment of resources. Under these circumstances, the BSP relationship could break down for a number of reasons. Demand-induced changes in output could have no eff ect on the relative productivity performance of tradables and nontradables, which is a key driver of the BSP eff ect. Even if there are relative productivity shifts, unemployment and excess supply of labor could come in the way of labor market arbitrage between the tradables and nontradables sectors, which is a key transmission mechanism for the BSP eff ect.
In this view, our results are susceptible to two critiques: Our BSP regression estimates could be off because they cover a period ( But we can attempt to address this critique. We can check if those advanced countries that had high rates of unemployment are outliers in relation to the BSP eff ect. Th e idea here is to see if the BSP eff ect breaks down as an empirical matter for those countries that experienced disequilibrium in labor markets.
We undertake a series of diagnostic tests. We identify all the countries in the advanced country sample that experienced large unemployment shocks defi ned as 30 percent (or higher) increases in 23. We use the term "local" to distinguish Germany, which enjoys the benefi ts within Europe that the United States enjoys globally as the issuer of the most coveted reserve currency. And we would emphasize the plural because the US government enjoys the exorbitant privilege of being able to secure cheap fi nancing but the US economy experiences an attendant cost of experiencing a correspondingly stronger currency.
the average unemployment rate between 2000-08 and 2009-11. 24 We then introduce a dummy for this group of countries (15 in number) in our IV and OLS regressions and interact this dummy with the income term in the BSP regressions. As the results in table 8 show, this income interaction eff ect is statistically insignifi cant, suggesting that at least empirically, as revealed in the data, the BSP eff ect continues to hold for countries with high unemployment; or strictly speaking that the BSP eff ect is no diff erent for this group compared with all the other countries in the sample that did not experience this underemployment of resources.
To further test the robustness of this result, we create two other groups, comprising, respectively, the 5 and 10 countries that experienced the largest shocks to their unemployment rates. We interact the dummy for each of these groups with the income term in the BSP equations. In our core IV specifi cation the income interaction eff ect is either insignifi cant or where it is signifi cant, it is because of being driven by one outlier, namely Latvia. In fact, dropping Latvia makes all the interaction coeffi cients insignifi cant.
So, at least in terms of data-revealed-preference, the dynamic BSP framework does not seem inappropriate for assessing currency valuations during the recent eurozone crisis.
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Note, however, that the unemployment dummy in table 8 (without the interaction dummy)
is itself signifi cant, indicating that on average high unemployment countries experienced a decline in real exchange rates relative to the average country in the sample. In order to account for this signifi cant intercept dummy but insignifi cant interaction dummy, we recompute our estimates for real competitiveness changes based on reestimating the BSP relationship, including the value of the intercept dummy, just barely signifi cant at the 10 percent level, and considering the insignifi cant income interaction dummy no diff erent from zero. In a sense, this could be considered the "true BSP relationship," which takes full account of the situation of countries that were faced with slack resources.
It turns out that accounting for the special situation of "high unemployment" countries does not aff ect our results. In fi gure 12, we plot the real competitiveness changes for the two cases and fi nd very little diff erence in the results.
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Suppose, and notwithstanding these empirical results and their robustness, there is still a theoretical basis for rejecting the BSP framework for assessing competitiveness changes during the eurozone crisis. In 24. Th ese countries are, in order of unemployment shock severity: Ireland, Spain, United States, Portugal, Latvia, Mexico, Estonia, Hungary, Denmark, Cyprus, United Kingdom, Lithuania, New Zealand, Greece, and Sweden. Note that we do not include low-income countries (Uganda, Bhutan), countries where we do not have ICP data (Guatemala, UAE, etc.), and countries already excluded from our model (Iceland) on the list.
25. Note that the inclusion of Latvia serves to reinforce, not dilute, the BSP eff ect refl ected in the fact that the income interaction eff ect is positive. And adjustment continues to be lopsided (although less so compared with the BSP-adjusted measure). For example, the relationship in fi gure 13 is still not upward-sloping as it should be in the eurozone and euro-tied panels with a statistically insignifi cant -0.12 correlation. If we remove euro-tied countries, including the outlier Bulgaria, the relationship becomes weakly positive with a correlation coeffi cient of 0.23, but again not to accepted levels of statistical signifi cance. Germany experienced a depreciation and the Spanish real exchange rate actually appreciated in this period.
Specifi cally, on the x-axis we have the results based on the IV equation shown in
Similarly, it continues to be the case that nominal depreciations are strongly correlated with real depreciations and that the number of countries that experienced internal devaluation is limited only to Ireland (fi gure 11).
CONCLUSIONS
Prima facie, competitiveness adjustments in the eurozone appear, based on unit labor cost developments, Second, the pattern of adjustment within the eurozone has been dramatically perverse, with Germany having improved competitiveness by 9 percent and with Greece's having deteriorated by 9 percent. Th e 27. Without adjustment (i.e., taking the raw Eurostat values), Greece's real exchange rate declined 3.3 percent, Portugal's 0.1 percent, and Ireland's 7.4 percent. For discussion on using adjusted versus nonadjusted 2007-13 estimates, see appendix A.
28. Th is is based on the real eff ective exchange rate that is not based on PPPs.
economic doctor would have ordered the exact opposite. Th ird, real competitiveness changes are strongly correlated with nominal exchange rate changes, which suggests the importance of having a fl exible (and preferably independent) currency for eff ecting external adjustments. Fourth, internal devaluationdefi ned as real competitiveness improvements in excess of nominal exchange rate changes-is possible but seems limited in scope and magnitude.
Overall, our results suggest that the costs of fi xing a currency-either via a currency union or a hard peg-can be considerable, a point made by several commentators, including Krugman (2012) and Wolf (2014) , and made in a more extreme form by Walters (1990) . Especially within a currency zone, if the core country (Germany, for example) enjoys local exorbitant privileges, the costs could take the form of substantially large and lopsided adjustment, with weak countries experiencing a deterioration in or insuffi cient improvement in competitiveness and core countries experiencing improvement or little appreciation. It is a damning indictment that Germany, the anchor of the system, which entered the crisis with a large account surplus either experienced a massive real depreciation (on our preferred measure) or at best no appreciation. Under these circumstances, sustaining the underlying currency union will pose formidable challenges.
Overall, it is hard to rule out the possibility that the present currency arrangements are not just a case of Versailles redux but also Versailles reversed with Germany no longer the punished victim, but the self-serving underwriter of the underlying economic and currency arrangements. 
EXTENDING THE BSP FRAMEWORK TO MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS CHANGES IN EUROPE AND THE ADVANCED ECONOMIES FOR NON-ICP YEARS
where "ICP" designates real exchange rate data drawn from the latest ICP rounds, "ICP_adj" refers to the Inklaar and Rao (2014) A fi nal point is that our log change values estimated by equation (6) 
